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What separates a memory from history? Both play an integral part in the formation of
identities, that of the individual and the nation. An individual is informed by their own
memories, experienced within a society, and forms perceptions based on historical events and
what they learn within their community. The memories of individuals come together to form a
collective base of knowledge, passed on from generation to generation to form the culture and
traditions of the nation. These memories are based on history, and eventually become history
themselves, and as such are subject to what is believed within collective understanding. An event
that is misremembered or misrepresented within the historical record has the power to alter this
collective knowledge and shift the perceptions of nations going forward. A major event, such as
a massacre, has ramifications for collective perceptions of the parties involved. To alter the
narrative of such an event (or cover up the truth) has the potential to alter the collective memory
and the lessons gained from it.
In the spring of 1940 approximately 15,000 members of the Polish military and
intelligentsia were reported missing from Soviet prisoner of war camps. Three years later, the
German occupying forces in the Soviet Union uncovered the first of their remains in mass graves
in the Katyn forest, sparking a global debate over who carried out this massacre. It would be
years before an international investigation determined the Soviet Union’s culpability, and
decades before the Soviet Union would actually admit guilt. The years in between the discovery
of the graves and the full understanding of what happened were full of international
investigations, Soviet denials, and a shifting collective understanding of what happened and who
was at fault.
This event demonstrates the power of historical narrative and shifting perceptions of
collective memory in the formation of national identity. For decades the Soviet Union relied on
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their perception as a hero of the Second World War to counter the evidence against them at
Katyn. Using testimonies and eyewitnesses (who may or may not be credible) the Soviet Union
pitted manufactured collective memory against real evidence. In ways that invoke the theories of
scholars like Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora, the Soviet Union relied on their false account
of the massacre and collective forgetting through an altered historical record to salvage their
national identity after committing the atrocity. The event is representative of the different roles
history and memory play in shaping identity and a crafting legacy.
Using collective memory theory as a starting point, my thesis will explore the
controversy surrounding the Katyn Massacre and its lasting implications for national identity in
an age of global collective memory. From the first attempts to find 15,000 missing Poles to the
current military action in Ukraine, Katyn prompted a pattern of Russian comportments and
actions that has large-scale implications for both collective memory and historical writing about
major events.

History and Memory
In 1925 the French philosopher Maurice Halbwachs wrote On Collective Memory. In this
seminal work, Halbwachs discussed the meaning of memory and its potential to impact society,
coining the term collective memory. Introducing new discussions of memory into historical
contexts, Halbwachs argues that the events of the past are not as static as they may appear. The
memories that inform how each person sees the world are colored by the context in which they
are remembered; it is in this way that the present affects the past. Memories are remembered not
in their accuracy but in their relevance to identity and emotion. It is through attempting to solve
issues in the present that memories are relived and altered. Halbwachs claims that the reality of
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the past events is never repeated, but that “the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the
basis of the present.”1. An individual’s present brings new relevance to memory and changes the
meaning. The atmosphere in which an event is remembered affects its relevance. The collective
relevance of Katyn shifted as it is remembered during the war, in Soviet occupation, and after.
While these memories inform the identity of the individual, they are formed and
contextualized within a society. Here we are introduced to Halbwachs’ theory of collective
memory as shared knowledge within a social group, or a “people”. This knowledge encompasses
shared experiences and memories that separate one group from another. This moves away from
the memory of the individual to a larger scale understanding of history and traditions. Collective
memory exists wherever people form groups, from the larger-scale memory of a nation or
religion to the smaller groups of one’s family or town.2
These collective memories begin with the experiences of the individual.3 Because the
individual forms their memories with others in society, “from the moment that a recollection
reproduces a collective perception, it can itself only be collective; it would be impossible for the
individual to represent to himself anew.” 4 The individual experience happens alongside other
individuals, creating a collective recollection. The perception attached to these experiences is
then informed by the beliefs of society. The biases and opinions of the collective also inform the
way an individual remembers, for “the mind reconstructs its memories under the pressures of
society”. 5 The individual’s perception of an event will be informed by what they are told within
the collective. In relation to history, the modern lessons gained from events in the past will be
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colored by how they are recorded and retold. A decades long cover up of a forest massacre will
alter the way the event is remembered.
This theory of collective memory extends to the legacy of a group’s culture. Halbwachs
explains that “to the extent that the dead retreat into the past, this is not because the material
measure of time that separates them from us lengthens; it is because nothing remains of the
group in which they passed their lives”6. Once a group’s members die out, so does their
collective memory. The notion that a particular group’s memory cannot outlive its members sets
collective memory as distinct from a group’s history which presumably would live on through
recorded measures. The collective memory attached to this history is anchored to living people
and does not have the same capacity to endure. Intentionally keeping information out of the
historical record, an attempt to alter history, cannot keep it out of memory but leaves it
vulnerable to the life of the group that remembers. In misrepresenting the events of Katyn, the
Polish citizens who understood the truth of the event held that knowledge collectively while it
was omitted from the historical record.
The difference between history and memory is explored extensively in writings on
collective memory. Pierre Nora’s Realms of Memory, written seventy years after Halbwachs,
explains the disappearance of a tradition of memory within society. In society’s effort to
conserve and archive its experience for posterity, memory overpowers history. Further, “This
uprooting of memory, its eradication by the conquering force of history, has had the effect of a
revelation … calling into question something once taken for granted: the close fit between
history and memory.”7 There exists a sort of cult of continuity, a desire to know where society
comes from and what originated its traditions. This is the impulse to record and understand a
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complete and constant identity, one based on history that is not subject to changes in cultural
knowledge. This desperation for recorded origins overpowers the collective memory already
serving a similar function.
The excessive archiving and recording in the name of history undermines the existence of
collective memory. Nora explains, “Memory is life, always embodied in living societies and as
such in permanent evolution, subject to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting … History,
on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no
longer.”8 Here, history is a pale representation of memory, placing events recorded as history
firmly in the past. Memory, on the other hand, has the ability to keep events and their lessons
alive within society, evolving to serve society as it shifts and grows. That which is forgotten is
not due to a lack of recording, but due to irrelevance within collective memory or an intentional
shift in the narrative. To historicize a memory is to make a fluid concept static, and to remove it
from modern experience.
Elaborating on the notion of strictly separate memories between different groups, the
notion of historicizing and forgetting remains incredibly relevant. Through “great actions or
creative endeavors” individuals enter into collective memory, assigning a sort of permanence
that evokes classical heroes.9 Yet to assign immortality to a figure within collective memory
implies that memory itself is immortal and grants “independence from the contingencies of
human existence. Personal memory is ephemeral: it is subject to forgetting and ultimately to
death.”10 Collective memory lives on, preserving the image of individuals, long past all who
were alive to know them are gone. This is especially true for the Katyn Massacre, as the legacy
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of the event continues even after the victims have long since passed. Yet Halbwachs insists that
collective memories live on only so long as members of their own group do as well. His
emphasis on separate groups undermines the idea of an immortal figure, as groups themselves
are not immortal. Nicolas Russell, a specialist in early modern theory, brings attention to this
dichotomy, as “memory does have a certain independence from the vicissitudes of human
existence, since much of it is preserved in books.”11. The texts and archives that immortalize
figures can outdate members of the group themselves and carry on their history, though the
collective knowledge associated with it does not live on. It is for this reason that historization of
an event is important, even if it removes some of the life. When no one is around to remember
what happened, the historical record is all that can tell the story. If the Soviet Union’s historical
record is all that survived of Katyn, there would be no true justice for the lives lost.
This difference between a shared collective memory within a group of people, and the
possibility of immortalized figures extending beyond secular grouping, illustrates the difference
of history and memory. This distinct grouping also ignores the possibility of a collective memory
existing in two groups simultaneously, the shared knowledge of events and figures within
separate peoples, able to live on if one group dies out. The groups discussed previously share no
events within their collective memory, but this is not the case in contemporary society.
In a modern age, events and information that form collective memories can be shared on
a global scale, far beyond the people who experienced the source. Current events are circulated
around the globe by media far faster than they could be by word of mouth. Nora recognizes this
point, explaining that “The nation is no longer the unifying framework that defines the collective
consciousness.”12 Indeed, engagement with history today also happens on a global scale. Angela

11
12

Ibid.
Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Conflicts and Divisions, 1:6.

7
Landsberg’s theory of prosthetic memory explains the entry of events into collective memory
from educational sites. Prosthetic memory “emerges at the interface between a person and a
historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum,”
breaking down the traditional bonds that form groups.13 Here, events can become a part of a
global collective memory as individuals form a personal bond to an event or person they have no
real relation to at an experiential site.
Even globally, no memory is entirely personal. An event occurring within one group is
witnessed by others and enters into their collective memory. An identification with an experience
may mean different things to different people, but the experience doesn’t happen in isolation, and
this memory cannot be exclusively owned.14 Access to information can be controlled, but the
memory of an event carries on through the collective. In this way history can be altered but
collective memory will reflect what the collective believes about an event. For Katyn, the
controversy surrounding the event was experienced globally, allowing a collective opinion to
form in nations not originally involved. This memory reflects reactions to the massacre and the
attempts to cover it up, the general consensus not always in line with the historical record. Rather
than acting as isolated events to separate people into groups, prosthetic memories bring people
together. The historical events learned about at such experiential sites may hold different
relevance to different groups of people, but knowledge about them can be shared globally.
Cultural sites act not only as locations of collective memory, but as physical reminder of
national identity. Venerating people or events deemed culturally important, monuments,
museums, or landmarks emphasize certain aspects of a nation. The state, the leaders of a nation,
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becomes caretaker of these monuments, even if they do not originally belong to the state,
allowing the state to shape and create a national image that fits in with their narrative.15 The
linking of these cites to tourism maximizes the visibility of pre-ordained cultural aspects,
celebrating what a nation is proud of while the darker events are not immortalized in the same
way. There are several monuments to Katyn, though not all present the same narrative. In this
way the different versions of the story are immortalized, preserving the controversy as well as
the event itself. This represents the forgetful nature of collective memory mentioned earlier, as
events have the capacity to live on, without a guarantee that they will remain accurately
understood.
In short, collective memory incorporates the experiences of individuals into a common
understanding. This collective knowledge forms wherever there are groups and can help create
communities through independent collective memories. The individual forms their own
memories within society, informed by the experiences of others and events that have come
before. As such, the collective memory of these events is not a strictly recorded history, it is
subject to change based on a group’s perception. Where history is recorded to preserve a static
version of an event, the collective memory continues to grow with the group. In the modern age,
experiences are shared globally and enter into the collective memories of groups not involved in
the initial event, spread through media and educational sites like a museum or monument. In this
way groups perceive one another, and form identities based on these perceptions. The identities
of nations rise out of collective perceptions on community interactions and shared knowledge on
a local and global scale.
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The Nation
While Halbwachs was the first to use the term collective memory in this national context,
the idea of shared memory within a group has existed for centuries.16 Early modern collective
memory does differ in the idea of memories being dependent on the group that remembers, a
central concept in Halbwachs’ work.17 These concepts were dependent on the object of memory
rather than who was doing the remembering. As such, no two groups can have access to the same
event within their memories, as the individual collection of events is what separates groups of
people. This is challenged by communities that overlap, with two separate groups each
remembering the same event and ignoring the imagined boundaries that created by totally
separate collective memories.
Despite the exclusion of overlapping communities in Halbwachs’s theories, the idea of
imagined boundaries forming community is a common thread of national identity. In his work on
the ideas of nationhood, Benedict Anderson explains the origin of the imagined communities.
Anderson explains, “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each
lives the image of their communion.”18 People exist in the same community, sharing experiences
and national identity without ever interacting. This is mirrored in the theory of collective
memory, where two people share an experience as a part of their identity without ever meeting.
Both communities, or collectives, are imagined, yet both form a strong identity for the individual
and the nation.
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While the nation is one imagined community, there are others that overlap (such as
religion or ethnicity). These overlapping communities challenge the notion of separate collective
memories, as the individual communities have a shared history yet retain their separate identities.
A person can be both religious and patriotic, influenced by the collective memory of both
communities. The shared knowledge within each community could allow the individual to be
secure in their identity as a religious person and a patriot. In a modern digital age, there are few
communities that don’t overlap. It is possible to share information between communities that
share no border or culture. In this way knowledge of events like Katyn can be shared on a global
scale as a part of a global collective memory.
The existence of other communities is important in forming national identities. It is
against other countries that a nation can set itself apart, particularly as a supposed superior entity.
This can be seen in national practices of colonialism and racism, practices which established a
national community by “generalizing a principle of innate, inherited superiority.” 19 A nation can
secure its identity as strong and superior by comparing itself to those around it, the different
collective knowledge and practices setting groups apart.
While comparison of communities can be integral to the formation of national identity,
the act of forgetting is also essential. When one community ends and another begins, the
formation of a new collective (a new identity) involves the forgetting of what came before. The
memories of the collective consist of the life of a community.20 They contain what is known as
important to that identity. What is forgotten collectively is not necessarily barred from entering
into history, but it does not play the same role in shaping identity. As discussed previously, the
way history is recorded and retold affects its relevance in collective memory, the more present
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source of knowledge in a community. The death of a community leads to the death of their
collective memory, and this form of forgetting allows new communities to rise.
When forming the nation, a formerly separate group of individuals must forget what
came before in order to come together. Renan even makes the argument that inaccurate history is
beneficial at the start of nationhood, claiming that “Forgetting, I would even say historical error,
is an essential factor in the creation of a nation and it is for this reason that the progress of
historical studies often poses a threat to nationality.”21 Indeed, the usual traumas of forming new
nations (war, invasion, etc.) must be forgotten to forge a united group. The inaccurate recording
of these traumas, often to paint the new nation in a more favorable light, allow this young nation
to create its own narrative, to reform the culture and customs of the group going forward.
Anderson agrees with this point in his writings, explaining that “All profound changes in
consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such
oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives.”22 The narratives create
memory, and memory creates the identity of the nation.
Even more than creating a new identity, this historical inaccuracy and forgetting can
preserve an identity that already exists. For Katyn, the inaccurate representation of the event
allowed the Soviet Union to maintain a heroic identity, one based on success in war and the
image of a liberator. Preventing discussion of Katyn or the teaching of it in schools shows a
desire to remove the event from collective knowledge, to create a collective amnesia, an attempt
that did not work.
A national identity is formed within a community, shaped by imaginary boundaries and
the collective experience of those within the nation. Overlapping groups can share collective
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memories, though they may have different resonance in different communities. The forgetting of
what came before, and the less desirable aspects of a community, is imperative to the formation
of national identity. This process can be helped along by historical error and misrepresentation,
as was attempted with the Katyn massacre, while a collective memory will be affected by the
way an event is presented and how history is recorded. The attempts to remove Katyn from
collective memory brought further attention to the event and added an aspect of controversy to
the massacre’s legacy, the opposite effect to what Stalin and the Soviet Union intended.

Katyn
The Katyn Forest Massacre is one example of an event where the recorded history and
collective memory do not align. At times when events are misrepresented through media and
intentional deception, those who remember what actually took place pass on the knowledge
collectively, allowing a collective understanding that spites the historical record. These
intersections are defining moments for national identity, where the image a state presents to the
world conflicts with how their actions are actually perceived. This is true for Katyn. For decades,
the event was denied and misrepresented, but a persistent effort by those who doubted the state’s
narrative and desired the truth pushed it to the surface. The fight for the truth about Katyn is
joined with the atrocity itself, both coloring the national image of the perpetrators. This process
began before the graves were ever actually discovered, but when 15,000 Polish prisoners of war
disappeared from the record and those who remembered them went looking.
The discovery of thousands of Polish military and civilians in Katyn was not entirely
unexpected. In 1941, when the Soviet Union officially joined the Allied war effort, they restarted
diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile. For the first time since the Soviets had
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invaded Poland at the start of the war in 1939, the two governments exchanged information and
worked together to face the Nazi threat. One of the first orders of business for the Polish
government was to establish the location of approximately 15,000 missing people, including
approximately 8,350 officers in the Polish military.23 Polish government officials began the
process of formally requesting the release of those in Soviet prison camps and any information
on where the missing people may be, but their questions received no answer. By October of 1943
more than 200 informal and formal inquiries were made by the Polish government (not to
mention inquires by other Allied forces), yielding no answers.24 A personal meeting with Stalin
began the narrative that the missing Poles, formerly held in Soviet Prison camps, had escaped,
many likely captured by the German military. There is no evidence to support this claim, least of
all no mention of 15,000 Polish prisoners making it to any foreign nation.25
Answers finally came in 1943 when German Communication Regiment 537 reported
findings of mass graves in the Katyn forest. Original reports estimated there to be over 10,000
people buried in the graves; the real number was approximately 4,443 officers and civilians
buried in this location.26 The graves immediately fueled German propaganda, a clear act of
Soviet violence that they hoped would fracture the Allied party’s cooperation. In a diary entry
from April 9, 1943, Joseph Goebbels, the chief propagandist for the Nazi party, exclaimed,
“Polish mass graves have been found near Smolensk. The Bolsheviks simply shot down and the
shoveled into mass graves some 10,000 Polish prisoners, among them civilian captives, bishops,
intellectuals, artists, et cetera … I saw to it that the Polish mass graves be inspected by neutral
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journalists from Berlin. I also had Polish intellectuals taken there. They are to see for themselves
what is in store for them should their wish that the Germans be defeated by the Bolsheviks
actually be fulfilled.”27 An expected cynical view of a human atrocity, the mass graves in the
Katyn forest had potential to serve as excellent propaganda against the Soviet Union, a direct
opposition to the image of a savior Allied nation the Soviet Union was portraying at the time.
The graves were an opportunity to call back to the Soviet Union’s own invasion of Poland and
collaboration with the Nazi party, facts that were not often discussed internationally as the Allied
parties worked together. Bringing the Soviet Union’s history into the collective memory became
a primary goal of Nazi propaganda.
Yet, the Allies did not believe the German version of the story. As author Zawodny
explains, “No one who lived under German occupation was apt to believe the German
description of the discovery, nor would the Allies. At the time of discovery about half a million
Poles were fighting against Germany. Their contribution to the war effort was well known
among the free peoples. The Poles were appealing throughout the Allied camp for facts … Public
opinion pointed an accusing finger at the Germans.”28 After the deceptive German motivation for
the invasion of Poland, and the Second World War, it was reasonable to assume they would lie
again.2930 Even years later, the persecution of Polish Jews and brutal street executions in German
occupied territory left a forest massacre by the Germans well within the realm of credibility. The
national identity of Nazi Germany as aggressors and liars could not compete with the collective
positive image of the Soviet Union. The Allies would not allow themselves to be so easily split.
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In response, the Nazi government encouraged the formation of an independent
international commission to investigate the site of the mass graves, hoping to convince foreign
powers that their conclusions were not influenced by Nazi propaganda motives. The
International Commission, whose members came from 12 countries other than Germany, arrived
in the Katyn forest on April 28, 1943, and began an investigation.31 They were joined by a
commission from the Polish red cross to investigate the evidence on behalf of the Occupied
Polish government. A third commission, a German Special Medical-Judiciary Commission
comprised of German medical professionals, investigated the graves at the same time. Together,
these commissions concluded that the men had been killed in the spring of 1941, when the Katyn
forest had still been in Soviet possession. Spruce trees planted on top of the mass graves were
younger than those surrounding and their growth bands suggested that they had been
transplanted three years prior.32 They found that Soviet-made rope had been used to bind
victims’ hands and discovered evidence of wounds from four-cornered bayonets, the kind used
by the Soviet army at that time.33 The bullets used were German made, a fact noted by Goebbels
as “unfortunate”.34 The bullets, made by the Genschow Company, would have been exported to
both Poland and the Soviet Union in wide circulation before 1939, furthering evidence towards
Soviet culpability. Once these reports were published, the historical record would place the
blame of the massacre with the Soviet Union, despite collective misgivings towards Nazi
evidence.
This was obviously disastrous to the national image of the Soviet Union. Unable to offer
any counter evidence without access to the gravesite (the Soviet Government had blocked an
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international Red Cross investigation and had not been invited to send any commission of their
own), the Soviet Union was forced to counter the accusation with denial. Officials from the
Soviet government approached the Polish government in exile asking for an official statement
that Germans committed the Katyn Massacre, an attempt to sway collective opinion. In light of
evidence from the international commissions, the Polish government in exile refused. In
retaliation, and in a desperate play to maintain face, Stalin sent an identical letter to the leaders of
the other Allied nations claiming that the Polish government had “descended to collusion with
the Hitler Government [and] has, in practice, severed its relations of alliance with the U.S.S.R.
and adopted a hostile attitude to the Soviet Union. For this reason, the Soviet Government has
decided to interrupt relations with that Government.”35 Shortly after Stalin and other officials
introduced a pro-Soviet Polish government (the ‘Polish Patriots’) and severed their recently
regained ties with the Polish government.36 Other Allied leaders, eager to maintain the alliance at
all costs, took action to support Stalin.37 While the evidence may have proven Nazi propaganda
correct in this instance, the need for cooperation outweighed any desire for other Allied leaders
to spread the truth of the event.38
In a telegram to the United States State Department the American Ambassador Admiral
Standley nicely outlined Stalin’s long-term goals in terms of the Soviet Union. A paraphrase
stated:
“We may, is seems to me, be faced with a reversal in European history. To protect
itself from the influences of Bolshevism, Western Europe in 1918 attempted to set
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up a cordon sanitaire. The Kremlin, in order to protect itself from the influences
of the west, might now envisage the formation of a belt of pro-Soviet states.’ The
subsequent seizure of Eastern European Republics by Soviet-groomed men
proved his acute observation, made two years before in advance, to be correct.
Poland was the crucial buckle in this belt, and it was necessary to ‘produce’ a proSoviet Government if the buckle was to hold. Unfortunately for the Soviet
Government, the communistic underground in Poland was extremally weak and
the Poles, whether in exile or in occupied Poland, could not easily forget the
Soviet-German co-operation in 1939, the seizure of Eastern Poland and the mass
deportations. There was scarcely a possibility that a pro-Soviet government would
emerge, particularly after the Katyn massacre. Stalin had to do it himself.”39
While German war-time atrocities dominated Allied media in an effort to motivate their soldiers
and civilians alike, the Soviet Union was not without its own motivations to remove high-status
members of Polish society. The invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union, in fact, the entire
collaboration of the Nazi and Soviet governments pre-1941, is a period often overlooked in
recollections of World War II in favor of a heroic Allied narrative.40 The fact is that Soviet
military action and treatment of Poles before joining the Allied forces was not all that different
from that of Nazi Germany, giving either nation a realistic possibility of murdering over 4,000
men in the Katyn Forest.41 Indeed the sudden disappearance of thousands of people is not out of
line with previous Soviet Actions. During the Great Terror Stalin and the police executed
thousands of political rivals, “Prominent persons from all fields disappeared without trace.”42 By
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the end of the 1930s, the Stalin regime built their power on mass executions, imprisonment, and
deportations to the Gulag.43 This is not to mention the brutal treatment of people living in Soviet
Satellite states, like the Holodomor, the manufactured famine in Ukraine that led to thousands of
deaths.44 While the act of massacre was not out of line with Soviet policies, these darker aspects
of the nation were not discussed. The Great Purge was framed as the uncovering of enemies of
the Soviet State, their deaths an act of national defense.45 Events like the Holodomor, and later
Katyn itself, became gaps in national history.46 The events carried on only through collective
knowledge, unacknowledged in the historical record for the duration of the Soviet Union.
The Katyn massacre also demonstrated clear interest in destroying Polish capacity to
reform society. The civilian casualties of Katyn included professors, doctors, artists, teachers,
and scientists, roles author Zawodny described as “the brain and heart of Poland”47. The
massacre targeted the keepers of memory, those with the potential to influence the collective
memory of Poland and carry on the nation’s culture and customs. In attempting to create a proSoviet state, Stalin targeted the Polish nation’s cultural, in addition to personal, legacy. The
erasure of these people, and then the denial of their murder, is an event within the pattern of
Soviet state rule. National Identities were broken down through mass execution and a firm
control of the official narrative, and the truth of the events were kept from the historical
narrative. It is through memory that they survived to be discussed in a post-Soviet world.
By September of 1943, the German military forces were on the retreat. As noted in
Goebbels’ diary, the Soviet military retook the Katyn forest on the 29th of September, which was
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“going to cause us [the Nazi party] quite a little trouble in the future. The Soviets are
undoubtedly going to make it their business to discover as many mass graves as possible and
then blame them on us.”48 He was correct. The Soviet government immediately sent their own
commission to investigate the grave site once more. This commission included no international
representation. The version of the massacre concluded by the commission was that the 15,000
missing Poles had been Soviet prisoners in work camps until captured by the German military
who ultimately killed the Poles in the Katyn forest. Their report leans heavily on the Germanmade bullets and includes no mention of the trees, ropes, or bayonet wounds, and concludes that
the massacre actually happened in the fall of 1941 when the land was German-occupied.49
A large part of the Soviet argument relies on eyewitness accounts from citizens in the
area who claimed to have seen both escaped prisoners and Polish prisoners under German guard
in 1941, long after the original account claimed they were killed. This is an ironic turn; the
previous Red Cross and German Committee commissions relied on science and the artifacts left
behind to determine the true nature of this event, whereas the Soviet commission relied on
memory. Here was the potential for the Soviet Union to change public opinion about the event.
The use of eyewitnesses and personal testimony rather than recorded facts made the report more
alive and gave the Soviet Union potential to sway collective perception of the event in their
favor, even if their report lacked real evidence. Some eyewitnesses later recanted their testimony,
calling into question the validity of the memories within this argument.50 These recanted
memories influence the legacy of controversy surrounding the event, as generations later Russian
citizens still want to believe in memory.51
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Time revealed further actions by the Soviet government to cover up any culpability in the
massacre. Boxes of personal items taken from the remains (including identification cards,
photographs, diaries, and letters, all used to date the massacre) were set to be transported. The
Soviet Secret police attempted to steal the items in transport, destroying the items in a dramatic
and drawn-out attempted heist.52 In the post-war Nuremburg trials, the Soviet Union was tasked
with prosecuting crimes against humanity in Eastern Europe. To the surprise of other Allied
powers who had worked at artfully ignoring Katyn, the Soviet Union officially tried the Nazi
party for carrying out the massacre.53 To discuss Katyn called direct attention to the MolotovRibbentrop Pact and the Soviet’s own invasion of Poland. To bring this period of history up
when the Nation was reaping a victor’s benefits post-war threatened the foundation of a new
chapter of Soviet, and later Russian, national identity.
That said, this was an opportunity for the Soviet Union to solidify Nazi guilt in the
massacre once and for all. Documents suggest that Stalin and other Soviet leaders planned a
show trial, similar to those used in the Great Terror in Moscow.54 A stipulation in the Nuremburg
Military Tribunal states that “The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge
but shall take judicial notice thereof.”55 Here was the possibility of a guilty verdict based upon
the carefully cultivated public opinion of the massacre, the common knowledge and collective
understanding based on the Soviet Report’s conclusions. The prosecution of the Katyn Massacre
was ultimately unsuccessful. The accused refuted the accusation, and the Soviets could not
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muster enough evidence to remove all doubt in German guilt. The initial charges of the massacre
are not included in the final judgement.
The other Allied powers did their best to ignore the issue of Katyn during the war, not
wanting to splinter support for or function of the alliance. Post-war these leaders, particularly
Churchill and Roosevelt, sought Soviet involvement in the United Nations. Looking into
evidence that the Soviet Union had murdered thousands of Polish citizens would hamper this
involvement, and they chose to ignore evidence against the Soviet Union once again.56 It was not
until 1951, after widespread national support and a cooling of U.S.-Soviet relations that the
United States government established a Special Congressional Committee to seek answers for
the 15,000 missing Poles. The investigation looked at previous evidence in a new Cold War,
anti-Communist atmosphere and established the beginning of what is now considered the
‘official’ narrative of the Katyn massacre, concluding that the NKVD (Soviet secret police)
carried out the massacre and that the Soviet government went to great lengths to conceal this
fact.57 It wasn’t until collective perception of the Soviet Union had grown less heroic in the eyes
of United States citizens that they were able to fully examine what had happened in the forest.
In early 1952 the U.S. special Congressional Committee released its final report placing
the blame of the Katyn Forest Massacre with Stalin and the Soviet Government. The thirteenmonth investigation was incredibly thorough, including classified documents from the Roosevelt
Administration and hundreds of witnesses, bringing memory into the argument against the Soviet
Union.58 While the evidence contained in this report was irrefutable, the U.S. government did
nothing with the information. A large item in the press, the report was heard and then filed away
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by the United Nations. No action to enact justice against the Soviet Union was considered.59
Currently in the middle of negotiations to end the Korean war, the U.S. government had no
intention of provoking the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, even without promise of any government action against the Soviet Union,
the report, and the rehashing of investigations into that chapter of history, clearly provoked the
Soviet Union. The Kremlin began a propaganda campaign against the United States in early
1952, shortly after the publication of the report. Kremlin publications claimed that biological
warfare and cruel treatment of Prisoners of War had been committed against Koreans by the
United States military.60 George F. Kennan, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union in
1952, consistently reported hostile remarks from the Soviet Union during his time there. In a
letter to his state department colleague, he claims that “The important question, therefore, seems
to me to be less whether the Soviet Government conducted this massacre than why anyone
should ever suppose it would be incapable of doing so.”61 The global sentiment, which had
before been largely determined nationally, depending on the accepted version of Katyn broadcast
by a nation’s government, began to shift towards a general consensus of Soviet Guilt.
Immediately following the release of the U.S. report, in addition to the propaganda
campaign, the Soviet Union began transporting ‘witnesses by the carloads’ to Russian and Polish
radio stations in other to attest that the incriminating contents of that report were a lie.62 They
had witnesses reiterate the narrative supported by the 1944 Soviet report as the only viable
explanation of the event, hoping to sway citizens with the memories (true or false) of their fellow
country-men.
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Even with Soviet denial and slanderous counter attacks, international outcry over the
events at Katyn grew in the late 50s and early 60s. The publication of J. K. Zawodny’s Death in
the Forest, in 1962 presented evidence of Soviet culpability internationally. Renewed interest in
investigation and prosecution of this massacre surfaced in Western nations. Memorial
ceremonies and attempts to erect monuments began in nations across the world.63 As sites of
cultural knowledge production, the commitment to create a physical commemoration of Katyn,
one that acknowledges Soviet guilt, represents the event’s presence in collective consciousness.
The drive to memorialize is a literal attempt to keep the memory of the event alive.
While this was going on, and while the Soviet’s continued to deny their involvement in
the massacre, more recently released documents suggests that the Kremlin was fully aware of the
real story. In fact, the true number of people killed at Katyn exceeds even the estimates of those
advocating for the official account. Szymczak explains:
“As we know now from the long-secret Soviet documents on Katyn, made
available to Western researchers in the post-Communist era, Aleksandr Shelepin,
the head of the KGB, the successor agency to Stalin's NKVD, reported to Nikita
Khrushchev the full details on the Katyn murders in a secret memo dated March
3, 1959. The total of Poles executed was not roughly 15,000, as was believed for
years, but 21,857. The victims, Shelepin reported, came not only from the three
prison camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostashkov, but included an additional
7,305 in other camps in the western Ukraine and western Belorussi.”64
Nearly 22,000 Polish citizens had been killed by the NKVD under Stalin’s orders in the Katyn
forest and nearby prison camps. In this report Shelepin also conferred that the Soviet attempt to
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place the blame on Germany had successfully convinced foreign citizens of Soviet innocence.
This was, in large part, not the case.
While the idea of German guilt was largely unpopular in international communities, it
was the only explanation offered in Soviet-occupied Poland. Students and young people
doubting the official record and seeking a more accurate account of information were forced to
turn to alternative sources.65 Even the official denial from the state did not stop memorials and
attempts to raise awareness.66 The history as presented by the Kremlin was rejected by the Polish
community.
By 1971 sustained outrage both within Polish-American communities and in the general
public (and the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations) led to a petition by the United States to the
United Nation calling for action addressing Katyn.67 This impetus, and a change of Soviet
government, shifted the tide of Katyn denial. Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. On March 9, 1989, the government of
Poland under the Jaruzelski regime officially blamed the Soviet Union for the Katyn Massacre. It
took a year for Gorbachev to officially respond, with an admission that the NKVD had, in fact,
committed the atrocity.68
Initially, the blame was placed purely with the NKVD leaders, Lavrenti Beria and
Vsevolod Merkulov. The initial admission undermines the number killed in the forest and
removes Stalin and the Soviet government from involvement in an attempt to save face. This was
corrected by Gorbachev’s successor, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin. In 1992
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he “’discovered’ the original 1940 execution order signed by Stalin and five other members of
the Politburo. This was, of course, the ultimate "smoking gun" in the sordid Katyn affair. The
Stalin order was reportedly found in Gorbachev's private Kremlin archive.”69 Yeltsin also
promised to persecute members of the NKVD who were involved and to make reparations to the
victim’s families. This never took place.70
This announcement was followed by a Russian reframing of events. The narrative of the
1939 Soviet invasion of Poland became one of liberation, continuing to uphold the heroic Soviet
image during the Second World War. In a post-Soviet environment, the release of information on
previous ‘blank spots’ in the historical record of Soviet states allowed the Russian federation to
present themselves in opposition to their predecessors. Releasing incriminating documents (such
as the “smoking gun” documents or evidence of intentional Soviet action in causing the
Holodomor famine) became a pattern of de-Stalinization and the “battles for history” underwent
by former Soviet States.71 Providing proof that such atrocities were committed by the Soviet
Union allowed the new Russian Federation to contrast their government against their
predecessors and leave the blame with the dissolved government.
In a symbolic gesture, Yeltsin arranged for a cemetery at the location of the Katyn
graves. At a ceremony to lay the corner stone the president claimed that "totalitarian terror
affected not only Polish citizens but, in the first place, the citizens of the former Soviet Union.”72
Now that the Soviet Union dissolved, the blame for their crimes and atrocities could be placed in
the past. According to Yeltsin it was Stalin’s government that called for the massacre of nearly
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22,000 Poles; the direct successors, the Russian Federation, were also victims and should not
have to share the blame. No symbolic apology was offered by Yeltsin, not at the gravesite or any
time after. His successor, former KGB officer and current Russian President Vladimir Putin,
visited Poland in 2002 and rejected the idea of an apology outright.73 The new era of Russian
national identity rejected the guilt for actions taken by their predecessors.
The Katyn Forest Massacre started as the mysterious disappearance of 15,000 Polish
prisoners of war and ended in a Soviet Cover up and a further smear on their legacy. The Soviet
Union’s desire to maintain their ‘good guy’ status motivated decades of denial for their
involvement in the massacre, despite all the evidence pointing to Soviet guilt. As a member of
the Allied parties, the Soviet Union leveraged their connections with other Allied leaders to
avoid spreading the truth of the event and keeping attention focused on the fight with Fascism.
Placing the blame for the deaths of nearly 22,000 people with the nation already posed to be the
villains of the Second World War allowed the Soviet Union to alter the collective understanding
of their role in the war and in the world.

History, Memory, The Nation, and Katyn
As an event, the Katyn Massacre has a massive legacy in the global collective
consciousness, and with lasting implications for the national identity of modern-day Russia. In
terms of collective memory, it is clear that the events that took place in the Katyn forest and
Kalinin and Kharkiv prison camps have influenced the lives of people not present at the
massacre. The individual experiences of the approximately 22,000 victims are lost, but their lives
are not forgotten. The individuals involved in this event either died in the forest or in the years
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following and still Katyn has entered into history and occupied international discussions for
decades following. The individuals die, collective experience lives on. The recorded history of
the event, the blame of the Nazi military for decades, and the desire to view the Soviet Union
positively after their victory in the Second World War contrasted with the collective
understanding of those who knew the Soviet Union was guilty and worked for the truth to come
to light. History and memory came into conflict, and the clash changed perceptions of national
identity going forward.
The controversy surrounding the event, the uncertainty as to which party was responsible,
colors the way this massacre is remembered. The loss of nearly 22,000 Polish lives is a tragedy
in itself. The death of intelligentsia, those who held extensive knowledge of Polish history, is a
blow to the nation no matter the perpetrator. This tragedy is further colored by drawn out debate
and denials as to who committed this crime.
At the time of the event, the atmosphere within which the massacre was contextualized
and collective memory was formed was that of German occupation. In an era where people
disappeared overnight, never to be seen again, it was difficult to believe that the Nazi
government would be telling the truth about their innocence in the Katyn murders.74 The Nazi
party’s false motivation for their initial invasion of Poland and gross mistreatment of occupied
nations did not lend the German nation any credibility during the war. 75 The revelations of Nazi
atrocities that spread globally post-war only furthered their reputation as a nation fully capable of
the forest massacre.76 Examining the findings at Katyn within the collective memory at the time
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of the grave’s discovery suggests an international distrust of Nazi claims and an unwillingness to
blame the Soviet Union, a member of the Allied parties fight against Fascism. While the Soviet
Union had committed similar atrocities against their own people and neighbors, these events
were reframed for the broad Soviet audience whereas German atrocities against the Polish people
were experienced first-hand.77 The altered historical record combined with collective mistrust of
Nazi Germany to encourage belief in Nazi guilt for the atrocity.
As the war progressed and years passed, the context of Katyn changed dramatically.
Evidence from the International and the Polish Red Cross commissions pointed a clear and
unwavering finger at Stalin and the Soviet Union. The Soviet government’s actions regarding
Katyn throughout the war (and the continued denial after) change the lens through which the
atrocity is viewed. Rather than a tragic loss of Polish life, the massacre became a vicious act of
Soviet aggression and misinformation.
By 1951, only a decade after the event, The United States Special Congressional
Committee examined the evidence of Katyn in a completely different context from the initial
investigators. The initial impulse to mistrust Germany was born out of Nazi actions, but also out
of a desire to protect the Allied parties. The Soviet Union joined the Allied war effort in a time of
desperate need, playing a massive part in conquering Fascism in Europe. The Soviet Union’s
international image as a hero and collaborator allowed other Allied leaders to turn a blind eye to
the events in Katyn, silencing media and not asking questions.78 A decade later, the actions of the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe altered this image. Without the protective aura of being one of
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the World War II ‘good guys’, the United States Congressional Committee was able and willing
to place the blame of the Katyn massacre on the Soviet Union.
On a more individual scale, the every-day world citizen’s perception of the Katyn
Massacre was informed by what was believed collectively. Hearing all of the unfolding
controversy indirectly positioned average people to believe what everyone else believed. The
falsehoods spread by the Soviet Union (and other Western leaders’ unwillingness to contradict
them, at least initially) influenced the global perception of the Katyn Forest Massacre. The
Soviet Union’s own reframing of their history, through intentional ‘blank spots’ in the record,
meant that the nation’s own history of massacre and genocide was not as present in collective
minds as their positive behavior in the fight against Fascism.
Indeed, the Soviet Union worked hard to remind citizens within the Union who the ‘bad
guys’ of the war were. Agnieszka Lazorczyk, who grew up in Soviet-occupied Poland explains
that “We were mostly conditioned to remember German responsibility for the war, but not so
much the Russian side of it. It was only after the fall of communism that history could be taught
freely.”79 In Soviet states, the guilt of Nazi Germany was emphasized so that the Soviet Union
could continue to present themselves as liberators. Lazorczyk explains that, in September, a
different film about World War II (where it was very clear that Germany was the aggressor) was
shown every day “so that there was no way you could forget what happened, who’s responsible,
[or] who started the war.”80 Stalin and the Soviet Union made clear attempts to prolong their
post-war image, even within communities currently occupied against their will. They needed to
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keep the image of Nazi Germany alive and terrifying so the actions of the Soviet Union (at least
the ones occupied people were allowed to discuss) would seem comparably better.
While the events of Katyn are considered historical now, the long-term process of
uncovering the truth maintained the events of Katyn in global collective memory for decades.
Following Nora’s argument, the inability to fully archive this event, to understand the full scope
in terms of evidence and experience, kept it within conscious memory. Through the series of
investigations, from the International Commission to the Soviet investigation and, finally, the
United States Congressional Committee, the narrative of the Katyn Massacre continued to shift
in collective memory. New discoveries or attempts to hide the truth continued to alter public
understanding of the event and the Soviet nation. Until the admission of guilt by the Soviet
Union decades later, there could never be a fully fleshed-out history.
This continued experience of the same event was shared by many communities, around
the world. While the primary desire to find the 15,000 missing Polish military and civilians was
initially limited to mostly Polish interest, the uncovering of mass graves in the forest involved
many different communities. The loss of these people was felt by the Polish nation, by the loved
ones they left behind and the government that had spent years looking for them. Nazi officials
played up the tragedy of the massacre for the German audience, emphasizing the large-scale loss
of Polish life for the German national community as evidence of Soviet violence.81 The event
was also communicated to the Soviets, and while the government blamed the Nazis, the loss was
understood by its citizens. Knowledge of what had been found in the Katyn forest spread around
the globe, new media carrying the experience to people who had never met a Polish person in
their life but who could empathize with the tragedy of it all. The two opposing accusations of
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guilt were experienced differently during the war, with many members of the Allied nations
believing the Soviet Union’s account, and the members of Axis nations receiving evidence
against the Soviet Union.82 As time passed and international tensions deepened, the global divide
on Katyn shifted from Axis versus Allies to international understanding versus the Soviet
account.
The physical reminders of the event provide evidence and a knowledge-sharing space to
the massacre. The prosthetic memory received from a monument or historical site gives the
individual visitor an attachment to both the place and event. The distinction is important, at least
in light of Nora’s view that “Memory fastens upon sites, whereas history fastens upon events.”83
The various landmarks for the people who died at Katyn reflect the dramatic changes in the
event’s legacy. Monuments in various cities allow a site to create new memories.
Alison Landsberg explains that “Monuments were intended to serve as guarantors of
national memory; they both created the illusion of a stable, recognizable past and promised to
serve as a bulwark against further social upheaval.”84 This is ironic in the face of the upheaval of
landmarks at Katyn.
After the publication of Zawodny’s Death in the Forest and the rise of information about
Katyn in Britain, a monument project started and was well underway by 1975. A private
enterprise, the British government had little control over the project. Despite this, incredible
pressure from the Soviet Union caused the British government to move the monument to a
cemetery further from the city than the initial location.85 This series of events demonstrated the
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unwillingness of the British government to offend the Soviet Union. In 1976 the monument was
unveiled in its new location, Gunnersbury. The official British government position is that they
were not willing to place the blame on the Soviet Union and that they had no involvement in the
memorial. Despite this several World War II veterans were involved in the memorial unveiling
ceremony. The monument reads ‘The conscience of the world cries for the truth to be
witnessed”.86 The direct call to attention to the lack of transparency with the Soviet Union
remains as a site of prosthetic memory. Those who visit have the ability to form memories not
only of the event itself, but with the long process to uncover the truth.
The first Polish monument to honor the lives lost at Katyn (and elsewhere) was initiated
in Warsaw in 1981, forty years after the atrocity. Still a few years before Gorbachev made the
official announcement of Soviet guilt, the initial placard was meant only to read “Katyn, 1940”.
As author Szymczak explains, “Even that was too explosive for the authorities. The police
confiscated it and the regime replaced it with another memorial, which read – ‘To the Polish
soldiers – victims of Hitlerite fascism – reposing in the soil of Katyn.’”87 Monuments, meant to
immortalize events and people for future generations to witness, here were used by the Soviet
government to further deny the truth about Katyn. Even including the real year of the massacre
was not allowed, as it pointed to Soviet guilt. The initial creation of monuments to Nazi guilt
attempted to create a lasting comparison that would favor the Soviet national identity. To
attribute the atrocity, in physical perpetuity, to the Nazi party allowed the Soviet Union’s
triumph to be an act of vengeance for those lost. This serves to only further the heroic image of
the nation.
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The new monument doubles down on false blaming of Nazi Germany, representing a
split in collective consciousness and the archived history. At this point it was globally
understood that the Soviets had committed the atrocities at Katyn,88 yet a monument to their loss,
meant to stand the test of time and help create new collective memories for following
generations, claimed a different guilty party. It was a desperate to attempt to salvage the Soviet
National image, and one that did not last. As Nora says, monuments are “the relics of another
era, illusions of eternity.”89 It would be less than a decade after this monument was placed that
an official announcement from Gorbachev dismantled the narrative the plaque attempts to
perpetuate.
A facet of collective memory that is clearly present in the legacy of Katyn is the
comparison of communities. In an attempt to create a Soviet Poland, one that was a part of the
Soviet Union and better served their interests, Stalin attempted to wipe out the collective
memory of Poland. If Halbwachs is correct in assuming that the death of a group results in the
death of their collective memories, the destruction of nearly 22,000 members of Poland’s elite
and military classes would eliminate the receptacles of knowledge and those able to spread
Polish collective memory.90
Indeed, Russia did achieve a Soviet Poland. Until 1991 the Soviet Union controlled the
nation and their narrative of the Katyn Massacre. The collective memory of Polish independence
carried through, even when actions and narratives were controlled. According to Halbwachs “in
our present society we occupy a definite position and are subject to the constraints that go with it,
memory gives us the illusion of living in the midst of groups which do not imprison us, which
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impose themselves on us only so far and so long as we accept them.” 91 The memory of Katyn,
of the evidence of Soviet guilt that came out during the war and in other parts of the world after,
filtered into occupied Poland. The collective memories of what came before allowed knowledge
to pass despite real social constraints. Kept alive through media, rather than the historical record,
the truth of Soviet atrocities was only explored by historians after the Union dissolved. This is
true for historians within Poland, and for atrocities like Holodomor, where “Professional
historians found themselves trying to “catch up” with writers, journalists, members of the
technical intelligentsia, and public activists, who had taken the initiative.”92 Memories pushed
past official Soviet restraints where history could not.
Agnieszka Lazorczyk grew up in Soviet-controlled Poland, however communism had
fallen by the time she went to high school. Still, she did not learn about the massacre in a
classroom. She explains, “It wasn’t in school where I learned about it. It was on T.V., through
the public conversation in the media. Newspapers, media, and through family. But my family
didn’t talk much about that, they didn’t have any personal experience with that. A lot of people
did.”93 A subject not covered in history classes; the collective knowledge spread after the fall of
the Soviet Union ensured knowledge of Katyn spread to those not alive at the time it occurred.
It was the supposed superiority of the Russian nation that allowed for Polish
incorporation into the Soviet Union in the first place.94 Placing themselves as the liberators of
Poland, Russia perpetuated the image that they were a superior force. In this way they set
themselves apart and validated the Soviet state’s control of Poland.95 The image built up of the
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heroic nation that was post-war Russia was not in line with a government that would authorize
the killing of thousands of people in the middle of a forest. Halbwachs claims that “the most
painful aspects of yesterday’s society are forgotten because constraints are felt only so long as
they operate and because, by definition, a past constraint has ceased to be operative … the mind
reconstructs its memories under the pressure of society.”96 In order to accept the information
presented in Russian society, that the nation is good and right, then the truth of the events of
Katyn must be forgotten. It is easier to blame a foreign nation, one that is universally accepted as
morally wrong (Nazi Germany), than to accept facts that contradict a national image formed by
collective understanding of Soviet heroism. Szymczak explains that “For the Russians,
struggling to regain the status they enjoyed after the war as a legitimate super-power, these
complaints and demands for a true accounting of history strike them as the unjustified carping of
peoples who are not properly grateful for their liberation from brutal Nazi occupation by the
valiant Red Army in 1944-45.”97 The evidence from the Soviet report of 1944 is inaccurate, but
it paints a more acceptable picture for the proposed Russian post-war national image. The
historical error allows this image to form, and forgetting the truth, whether through active hiding
of evidence or willful denial, creates a new legacy for the event.
The admission of guilt in 1990 alters this image. For those actively resisting Soviet
occupation and misinformation, the image of a valiant Soviet Union had long since evaporated.
For those within Russia, this was a shift in their historical understanding, their collective
memory. The reframing of guilt by President Yeltsin allowed them to transfer their national
image from one of a heroic Soviet Union to a strong but victimized Russia.98 Claiming that
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Russians too had been victims of Soviet mistreatment put them in line with the Poles killed in
Katyn and removed national guilt. This is not entirely untrue, as the Soviet State did commit
atrocities against its own members, however the Russian Federation did not completely distance
themselves from their Soviet past. This new Russian identity attempted to retain the heroic
values of the Soviet Union, as it was still the individuals in the army that put a stop to Hitlerite
Fascism but did not absorb the guilt of the Soviet government. This partial distance was not fully
successful.
Lazorczyk explains her own impression of Russia “There is distrust, there is lack of
friendly feeling towards the nation. I don’t think it had to be that way, there was this period after
Yeltsin, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, that I think there was some hope that we could all
become normal countries, democratic countries, and we can have normal relations with Russia.
Some of the Polish governments pursued that. They were not trying to be a foe or clash with
them, but they were always cautions. They saw the country as a potential threat which I think the
current day is proving right.”99 The new independent Russia could not escape the collective
perceptions attached to the Soviet Union.
Angela Landsberg states that “History’ has never had the privileged access to the ‘real’;
like all knowledge, historical knowledge is and has always been mediated through narratives and
interpretation.”100 The real knowledge of the Katyn Forest Massacre took decades to uncover.
Throughout that period ‘truth’ about the event depended on which government controlled the
narrative. The desire to maintain their global standing and internal image of heroism led to a
Soviet cover up and the denial of fact for half a century.
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Russian Identity After Katyn
The emotional impact of the Katyn massacre and the decades long cover-up extended far
beyond Eastern Europe. In 1991, Jersey City, New Jersey erected a monument to the victims of
the Massacre. Across the ocean from where the event took place and the victims lived, this
monument represents the global effect of the massacre on collective memory. In a 2020 Time
article, Keith Lowe explains the monument’s significance:
“But, while the monument is ostensibly dedicated to the Katyn massacres, the
word “Katyn” has itself become a symbol of every betrayal that the Poles were
forced to suffer during the second half of the twentieth century. The soldier who
is being bayoneted upon his plinth represents much more than the thousands of
Polish officers killed at Katyn in 1940. He represents Poland itself, in all its tragic
martyrdom.”101
The monument is not only for those who lost their lives in the forests, but also for their loved
ones and those forced to flee their nation, 10,000 of whom ended up in Jersey City after 1945.
Fifty years after the event itself, a nation not originally involved wanted to leave a physical
marker of the experience, a site of prosthetic memory to shape the perception of modern Russia
going forward.
While foreign nations remember the Katyn Massacre as a symbol of Soviet portrayal and
Polish loss, the desire to maintain a Russian heroic national image carries on into contemporary
Russia. In an article titled “The ‘Official’ Version of the Katyn Massacre Disproven?”, historian
Grover Furr debates the accepted version of events in Katyn. In a 2013 article claiming that the
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official version of events was shaped in an anti-communist, anti-Soviet atmosphere (not entirely
untrue, as mentioned earlier), Furr presents a version where the Soviet Union carried out the
murder of some of Polish victims, but the Nazi military committed the bulk of the massacre. This
desire, even more than 70 years after the event, to preserve Soviet innocence (or, at least, lesser
guilt) points to the power of a collective narrative in shaping the national image.
Furr claims that “the story of the Katyn Massacre [is] a fabrication intended to facilitate
the destruction of the Soviet Union. During the following years this position has attracted much
support among what we might call Left Russian nationalists, people supportive of the USSR
during the Stalin period for its achievements at industrialization and defeating the Nazis.”102
There is a strong movement to deny the events of Katyn, to change both national and
international collective memory of the event and rewrite the historical record. Furr claims that
Katyn is “the most famous crime alleged against Stalin and the Soviet government”.103
This 2013 article is only the latest in a trend of Russians denying the official account of
the Katyn Massacre. Since the official announcement by the Russian government there have
been those within Russia who doubt the evidence.104 For larger, more mainstream publications, it
took several years for dissenting views to be published. Szymczak explains that “The revival of
the Stalinist propaganda about Katyn first appeared, the Economist reported, in September 2007
in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, a state-owned newspaper. Repeated by the mass-market Komsomolskaya
Pravda the following month, it next turned up a month later on TV Sentr – a station operated by
Putin's political allies, and then in an "up market" publication, Nezavisimaya Gazeta.”105 The
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inclusion of an unofficial narrative, one not supported by the evidence, or any modern
government, shows the impact of Katyn in Russian consciousness. It is easier to maintain a
national image, one built around strength and heroism, if Katyn was committed by a different
nation, one that history agrees was in the moral wrong like Nazi Germany.
Modern denial is not the only controversy that surrounds Katyn in contemporary society.
On April 10, 2010, an airplane carrying the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, and many
other high-ranking officials crashed in the nearby city of Smolensk.106 A total of 96 people died
including the president, his wife, the Polish army chief of staff, head of the national bank, deputy
foreign minister, members of parliament, presidential aids, and the family members of Katyn
victims. All had been on their way to a ceremony honoring the Katyn massacre’s 70th
anniversary.107
The plane crashed after the pilot ignored warnings that conditions were not good at the
Smolensk airport and went down attempting to land in the thick fog. There were clear signs that
this event had been a terrible accident, but the prominence of people involved and such a close
tie to an already controversial event led to conspiracy theories that the crash had been
orchestrated by the Kremlin.108 Agnieszka Lazorczyk remembers the event. She explains that
“We know they were capable of horrible acts, so I think that created fertile ground for this
conspiracy theory to grow. It became part of the political campaign of the current ruling party.”
The distrust of Russia that bred from decades of deception and strict control of information made
the Polish community willing to believe that they would commit another atrocity. The image of
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Russia that exists in Poland is linked to the events at Katyn and is therefore the opposite of a
heroic nation.
Lazorczyk explains that the plane crash “made the event even more prominent in public
consciousness in Poland. Now the two are kind of interlinked. You can’t think of one without the
other. Here you have the murder of Polish elite, and then you have a plane crash that killed part
of Polish elite as well. It was a tragic coincidence.” The new loss of life near Katyn keeps the
initial event present in public memory. Spread through media, news of the plane crash also
brought awareness of the Katyn massacre to new audiences.
While the Russian federation has positioned themselves as victims of the Soviet Union,
and therefore not an inheritor to their crimes or guilt, they still repeat their mistakes. The
modern-day conflict in Ukraine shares many similarities with the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Poland and occupation of Eastern Europe.
Indeed, the crimes committed in Bucha, a suburb of Kyiv, mirror the events of Katyn, 80
years later. Satellite photos from between March 9th and 11th reveal bodies left on the streets of
Bucha while the town was occupied by the Russian military.109 When the territory was retaken
by Ukrainian forces in early April (Russian forces withdrew March 30th), the bodies of civilians
were found throughout the city. Many had their hands bound and showed gunshot wounds to the
head, in nearly the same manner of execution as the Polish victims suffered in Katyn. 110 The
city’s mayor, Anatoliy Fedoruk reports that over 400 bodies have been found so far.111
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A telegraph by the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that these bodies were ‘just
another provocation’ meant to discredit the Russian nation. The official Russian stance is that
these bodies were placed after March 30th, when the Russian military officially withdrew from
Bucha, and despite satellite evidence to the contrary.112 Furthering parallels to Katyn, throughout
the invasion of Ukraine the Russian government has alluded to ridding the country of Nazism.
President Vladimir Putin had made the claim that Ukraine’s government is openly pro-Nazi,
despite Ukrainian President Zelensky being Jewish and passing legislation to oppose antiSemitism.113
The rhetoric is clearly an attempt to stir up the post war-national image of the Soviet
Union once more, to revive support within Russia and in Western media for the invasion of
Ukraine. If Russia is sending their military in to liberate Ukrainians from Neo-Nazi influences,
they must still be heroic. This is similar to the dialogue that the initial Russian invasion of Poland
in 1939 was to “liberate the Ukrainians and Belorussians in Poland's eastern borderlands from
the repressive rule of Polish landlords.”114 Posing an invasion as liberation allows for the Russian
nation to remain in the right, particularly if they again call on Nazism to juxtapose their good
deed (liberation) with a widely accepted moral wrong (Nazism). The story of the bodies found in
Bucha and the Russian denial of guilt despite all incriminating evidence so closely resembles the
events of the Katyn Forest Massacre, as if history is repeating itself before our very eyes.
Agnieszka Lazorczyk was not surprised at how far Putin was willing to go. “There was a
reset with Russia, they [western Europe and Russia] got friendlier, they had a lot of economic
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ties and all that. The Polish perspective was ‘these people are naïve. They don’t understand what
they are capable of or what their true intentions are.’ I wish we were proven wrong. I would
rather move on, and all be friends and get stronger together but unfortunately that’s not what
happened. They now have to revisit what this country is really about, how we deal with them.
But for Poland this is not surprising.” 115 The atrocities committed by the Soviet Union never left
the collective consciousness of nations under their control. Even with the Soviet Union gone, the
same mistrust lies with Russia. Any hope for a friendly relationship did not prevail, and the
actions taken by the current Russian government have proven collective fears accurate.

Conclusion
It is clear that the collective memory of the Katyn Forest Massacre shifted over time as
information of the event was revealed. Evidence reexamined, testimonies recounted, and
eventual confessions all contributed to the perception of a single event. To bring to mind Katyn
in a modern context conjures a complex image of the Soviet Union and the atrocities they have
committed. But this was not always the case. The Soviet Union had some success in repressing
the facts and convincing foreign leaders to support their own side of the story.
Why does this matter? Stalin and the Soviet Union lied about committing an atrocity. In
the context of war, and out of a desire to leave alliances uncomplicated, members of foreign
nations believed them. The historical record was written with Nazi guilt, as can be seen in the
gaps within Polish education and the physical plaque placed at the gravesite. In an age where
communities interact on a global scale, committing an atrocity like Katyn has the power to alter
national identity, and the Soviet Union temporarily avoided that mark on their record. The Katyn
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massacre is not the only atrocity committed by the Soviet Union, and not the only one to cause
gaps in their historical record, but it is emblematic of a pattern within their nation and an
excellent example of memory versus history.
Memories carried down through families were spread in Poland once the Soviet Union
disbanded. These memories helped fill in the gaps, but only when the structure controlling
history was dismantled. Had this structure remained in power the knowledge of what happened
at Katyn would remain alive in memory but omitted from the archive. In this way, the truth of
Katyn and an accurate image of the parties involved would survive only as long as those who
remember them.
Katyn was corrected in the historical record, but the attempts to downplay the atrocities
committed by the Soviet Union had some success. History classes still celebrate the Soviet’s
entrance into World War II as a member of the Allied parties. The large cultural legacy of
Nazism as an ultimate ‘bad guy’ (while not unearned) overshadows other morally reprehensible
behavior committed at the same time, by other parties. The lies of the Soviet Union were
disproven yet the image they were created to protect does not completely vanish.
Katyn remains present in the modern collective consciousness, yet it springs to the front
as Russia begins new Eastern European conflicts. The continued pattern of lying about atrocities
and placing the blame elsewhere threatens the historical record, depending on the memories of
people within a war zone to represent the reality of a situation. Without those memories, it is
possible for the collective to forget relevant historical details. When the collective forgets,
history repeats itself, and we learn all over again.
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